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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
J. R. \V ALKI£R,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
TRACY LOA.'J & rrRJUSrr COMpANY, a corporation, as reeeiver for \VALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY, a corporation,
Drfendcmt and Appellant.

Case No. 5338

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM rrHIRD JUDIOIAL DISTRICT
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

\Valker Brothers Dry Goods, a Utah corporation,
operated a large retail department store in Salt Lake
City for nearly two generations. It was one of the oldest
and leading mercantile establishments of the western
section of the United States, and had been owned by the
Walker family until November, 1928 (Abstract 71; Renshaw rrrauscript 53) ·when E. F. Dreyfous aequired stoek
control. The plaintiff, J. H. Walker, was elected Pres.i-
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dent and director in 1903 (Ahs. 25; Trans. 30) and occupied those positions even after the control of the corporation passed to Dreyfous (Abs. 35; Trans. :38). From
1903 to November, 1928 he was the active head of the
business, but after that date, Dreyfous completely ordered its destinies (Abs. :-~5; 'l'rans. :~9) and the plaintiff Walker, was ''only a figure head.''
Following the entry of Dreyfous into the corporation, the store building of the oompany in Salt Lake City
was remodeled at an expenditure of $320,000.00 (Abs.
35; Tmns. 39). Finall(:ial diflicul ties followed which
resulted in the appointment of Tracy Loan & Trust Company, a eorporation, as equity receiver for the company
and its properties by the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County on .June
25, 1930. 'l'he receiver qualified aml immediately entered
into possession of the assets and business of the company aml for a temporary period continued the operation of the department store business.
At least twenty-five years prior to the receivership,
the company established a practice of encouraging its
empLoyees to "deposit" their surplus funds or savings
with the company (Abs. 55; Trans. Renshaw 41). These
funds were repayable on demand (Abs. 33; Trans. 36)
and the company paid 6jr. interest per annum (compounded semi-annual1ly) (Ahs. 44; Trans. 30). The "deposits" were evidenced by a small hook which simply
bore the imprint "vValker Brothers Dry Goods Co."
(Renshaw Exhibits A and B). No rules or regulations
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~overing

the :so-called deposits were printed in the book
nor is there any evidence that any regulations ever existed, except a general understanding of the agreement
of the company. ln 1929 these "deposits" amounted
in total to about $41,000.00 (Ab:s. 5G; Renshaw Trans.
41 ). lu 1924 they amounted to $G0,514.55 (Abs. 30;
Trans. :35). For years the company paid or credited the
earned interest on the respective aceounts of the employees (Abs. G9; Renshaw 'l1 rans. 5:3). 'rhe funds were
"wi thdra wablc" on demand of an employee ( AJbs. 44;
Renshaw Trans. 30). (Abs. 33; Trans. 36).
After Dreyfous acquired contro'l of the business
these so-called "Jeposits" were reduced by "repayment" to the "depositors". \Vhen the receiver was apvointed the t,otal of such "deposits" amounted only to
$11,778.78, exelusive of the sum of $2909.85, which latter
<mwunt is involved in this action (Abs. 68 and 69; Ren:,haw Trans. 52) as hereinafter set forth. It also appears that the company employees from time to time
received verbal assurances from the control accountant
of the c·ompany that their funds on deposit were "absolutely safe and if anything ever happened to the store,
they would be paid in preferenee to any one'' ( Abs. 44;
Henshaw Trans. 30; Abs. 73; Renshaw Trans. 56). The
aecountaut elaims to have given these assurances to the
employees at the instance and under the orders of the
}Jlainti ff, Walker, when he was manager of the business
and that Dreyfons, after he became manager, also directed that she inform the employ(•es to the same effect.
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(Abs. 50; Renshaw Trans. 34). However, there was no
written agreement entered into by the company erecting
any specific trust fund protecting these "deposits'' of
the employees, nor attempting to make the "deposits"
preferred claims in event of insolvency of the company.
The employees "deposited" their funds from time
to time and in each book, which was held by the employee, the amount of the "deposit" was acknowledge<l.
Interest credits were shown in like manner in the hooks
(Renshaw case Exhibits A ancl B). The funds were
received from the employees by the company at its regular cashier's ~window or were paid to the eontrol a(~
countant at her desk (Ahs. 52 and 53; Renshaw Trans.
37, 38 and i39). The "deposits" were never ear-marked.
(Abs. 54; Renshaw Trans. 40). The company maintained comme.rcial bank ace.ounts in several of the Salt
Lake City banks (A!hs. 53; Renshaw Trans. 38) and
funds of the company received in the operation of its
large business ancl the employee ''deposits'' were deposited in these banks. (Abs. 53; R,enshaw Trans. 38).
In making these bank deposits there was no distinction
made as to funds received from the employees on ''deposit'' and the funds representing general income from
business operations. (Abs. 53 awl 54; Renshaw Trans.
38, 39 and 40). All money that was, received at the store
of the company was deposited without distinction as to
its souree. Employees "deposits" were intermingled
with general income and deposited (Ahs. 63 and 64;
R.enshaw 'rrans. 47, 48, 49) in the eommercial banks.
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'rhe obligations of the company were paid out of the
eommercial bank deposits of the company. There was
no speeial bank account representing only the funds of
employees "deposited with the company, and when an
employee desired to ''withdraw'' funds from the company, he was paid by check drawn on any one of the
l)aukiug depositm·ies of the company. No special bank
aeeomtt was used for this purpose (Abs. 64; Renshaw
Trans. 48 and 49). There was a complete intermingling
and confusion of the employees "deposits" with the
general funds of the corporation. (Abs. 57; Renshaw
Traw.;. 42) ( Ahs. 64; Renshaw Trans. 48).
I~arly in the Walker administration of the eompany
the eorpora tion books showed these employees "deposits" as a liability under the title of "On deposit" (Abs.
47; Renshaw Trans. 3B). A certified a.eeountant questioned the practice as partaking of the nature of a banking business, whereupon the ledger account caption was
c:haugecl to ''Cash due J<Jrnployees' '. On the balance
sheets of the company the amount due all of the employees was always shown as a liability, and it was
11ever represented as a trust fund or a preferred claim
(Abs. 27; Trans. i~2; Abs. 62; Renshaw Trans. 47). During the Dreyfous administration the practice remained
the smue, exeept that there was an individualization of
the aecounts instead of carrying but one aecount in the
general accounting· set of the company. ( A>bstract Gl;
Henshaw Trans. 45).

The company, for years, placed its surplus funrls
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in time certificates of deposits issued and negotiated by
the cornmoreial banks with which it did business. (Abs.
31, Trans. :~5; Abs. 4:8, Renshaw rrrans. 34). When the
credit balances in favor of tho company at a particular
bank accumulated beyond a certain point, a time certificate of deposit would be secured (Abs. 54; Renshaw
rrrans. 40; Ahs. 58, Renshaw rrrans. 4:~; Abs. ;)9, Renshaw Trans. 4:3) from the bank. These time deposit certificates were for six or twelve months (Abs. 58; Rensha\\'
rPrans. 4i3), and they represented excess emmergeney
funds of the f~ompany (Ahs. 51; Rensha1v Trans. 3G).
They represented at 011e time a sum greatly in excess
of the company's lia hili ty to its employees for their
so-called "deposits" (Abs. 58; Renshaw Trans. 43). In
1924 at the time of the eompany audit, the employees
"savings accounts" carried a liability of $()0,514.55
( Abs. 30; Trans. :14). The company had time deposits
of $42,47G.OO ( Abs. 31 ; rrrans. :~5) a cashier's cheek of
$10,000.00 and a speeial hank account of $17,083.85.
These represented a reserve "to take eare of any emergency" (Abs. 33; Trans. 36).
In pur(~hasiug these time eerti{icates of deposit tl:e
eompany did not ear-mark funds received from its employees as savings or "on deposit" and buy a special
certificate of deposit with such funds (Ahs. 54; Renshaw Trans. 40). Such funds went into the company',:;
general bank aceounts indiscriminately, along with otlw:
funds of the company ( Abs. 54; Renshaw Trans. 40), nnd
wheu the balance at auy hank accumulated to a point
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as to permit the purchase of a time certificate, the certificate was acquired. (Ahs. 54; Renshaw Trans. 40).
'fhe certificates eanied no indication on their face that
tlwy \\"ere for any particular purpose. At the time of
Uw appointment of the receiver, no time certificates in
favor of the company existed (Abs. 59; Renshaw Trans.
44). They had he en previously cashed and the proceeds
used hy the corporation in its business.
Alice Prye, (also known as Mrs. Alice Young) had
for years been employed as a domestic servant in the
home of the plaintiff, Walker. She was never an employee of vValker Brothers Dry Goods Company. (Abs.
19, Trans. 25 and 26; Abs. 20, Trans. 26; Abs. 34, Trans.
:37). The plaintiff with her consent, placed her savings
on "rleposit" with ~Walker Brothers Dry Goods Compauy in the same manner as if Alice Frye had been au
employee of the company. (Abs. 19, Trans. 25; Abs. 34,
'l'rans. 37 ancl38). 'rhe account was built up on a similar
plan as the accounts of the company employees. (Abs.
19, 'l'ram;. 25; Abs. 27, 'rrans. 32). In May 1930 ( Abs.
20, 'rrans. 26; Abs. 34, Trans. 38) and while plaintiff
was president and director of the company, he made
settlement with Alice Frye and she assigned her claim
against the eompany a rising out of the "deposit" of
her funds, to the plaintiff (Abs. i34; Trans. 38). The
<'redit balance in favor of Alice Fry at this time ap!Jroximated the sum of $5,909.85.
The wife of plaintiff at this time was indebted to
the eompany on au open account in the approximate
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amount of $3000.00. (Abs. 18, Trans. 24; Abs. 34, Trans.
~~8).

V{hen the plaintiff had acquired from Alice Frye

her right and title to the "deposit" claim he went to
the control accountant of the company (in May 1930)
<:md ordered her to transfer a sufficient amount from
the Alice Frye account to pay aud settle the liability
of his wife on her account due the company and to hold
the balance to his credit ·with authority for his wife
to purdwse merchandise against it. (Abs. 18, 'J1rans.
24; Abs. 2:3, Trans. 28 awl 2~); Ab:,;. 24, Trans. 29; Abs.
34, Trans. 38). The control accountant transferred approximately $3000.00 from the "B1 rye account (then o-vmed
l)y plaintiff) to the credit of the account of Mrs .•J. R.
"\Valker, plaintiff's wife. '11 his paid this aceount in full
(Abs. 18, Trans. 24). Upon this transfer being effected
there remained a balance of $2,9mJ.85 to the credit of
the plaintiff as assignee of Alice 11-,rye. Thereafter and
prior t.o the appointment of the receiver for the compauy, the wife of plaintiff heemne indebted to the company in the sum of $329.98 for merchandise purehased
ty her. After the appointment of the receiver, the wife
of plaintiff became indebted to the receiver in the additional sum of $2,006.03. llowever, it was stipulated by
eounsel and found l>y tbe trial court (Abs. 79; Trans. 11)
that the defendant a:,; rec-eiver, had sold to a third perE>on the accounts against plaintiff's wife and therefore
the question of offsetting the total amount due from
plaintiff's wi ft~ to the receivership estate against plaintiff's claim harl been eliminated from the case (Abs. 79;
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rr'rans. 11 ). No further consideration need be g1ven to
this question of offsets.
~\ftcr the appointrne11t of defendant as receiver of
Walker Br.others Dry Goods Company, the plaintiff filed
his proof of claim with the said receiver within the tim0
ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the receiver:ship proceedings. Plaintiff in his proof of claim alleged that his claim was preferred and entitled to full
payment before the common creditors of the insolvent
eorporatiou were entitled to participate in a distribution
uf the receivership assets. The defendant receiver refused to allow the claim as a preferred claim but approved same as a common claim without preference.
']'hereupon the court in which the receivership proceedings were and are pending- ordered plaintiff to institute
Dnd prosecute a plenary aetion against the defendant
receiver to determine if a preference existed in favor of
plaintiff which would entitle him to full payment of his
claim before common creditors of the receivership estate
\','Onlrl be entitled to participate. This present action is
the plenary action ordered by the court.

f11 the receivership proceedings the court ordered
the defendant reeeiver to set up a reserve of cash funds
of $11,268.33 to protect the creditors of the receivership
estate who are employee "depositors" as herein desigllah~d and desc~ribed, in the event it was finally determiner} they were entitled to payment of their claims in
full. The cond further directed the receiver to pay to
these creditors claiming preference the same dividends
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as were paid common creditors as and when such dividends were paid, without prejudice as to either the receiver or creditors claiming preference. The receiver
!1as earrietl out the order of the t'ourt in all respeets. The
reserve fund has been ere a ted and the employee "depositors" have been paid dividends in the same proportion
as paid common ereditors. (Abs. 77; rrrans. 9).
The trial eourt in this action found that the assets
of \V alker Brothers Dlry Goods Company are immilicient
to pay the general creditors more than approximately
55,j{ of the amount of such claims allowed by the receiVer. (Finding XIII, Abstraet 80, Trans. 11).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ARGUMENT.

I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PREFERENCE OR
PRIORITY IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS CLAIM BY
THE DEFENDANT RECEIVER, BECAUSE (a) THE
TRANSACTION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF A N D
WALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY INVOLVING THE ALICE FRYE ACCOUNT DID NOT
CHANGE A DEBTOR AND CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE COMPANY
INTO THAT OF TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE
TRUST; AND (b) THE SilVIPLE CONTRACT DEBT
DUE PLAINTU'F, AS ASSIGNEE OF ALICE FRYE
WAS NOT CONVERTED INTO A TRUST FUND.
Appellant's AssigumelllR or ETror Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
b (a), 9, 10, (a and c), and 11 involve the foregoing propo-
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tlition. Therefore, as a matter .of convenience they may
1Je discussed together. Assignments 2, 3 and 9 are directed against Finding of Fact VI, which is as follows:
'"rhat vrior to the appointment of the defendant, as receiver of "Walker Brothers Dry
Goods Company, as aforesaid, the plaintiff delivered to and deposited with tlle said 'Walker Brothers Dry Goods Gomprany the sum of $2,909.85,
upon an express trust, to-wit: that said sum he
held and retained by the said 'Valker Brothers
Dry Goods Company f.or the sole, specific and sperial purpose, and that only, of securing the payment of and paying for the future goods, wares
and merchandise to be pun·hased hy the wife of
plaintiff from \V alker Brothers Dry Goods
store.''
Assignments 4 and 5 are directed against Finding
of Fact VII, which is as follows:
"That the said deposit so made by the plaintiff to
alker Br.othen; Dry Goods Company un<ler the express trust, as aforesaid, \vas accepted
and held by 'Walker Brothen; Dry Goo<h; Com,
pany in trust as a special fund or deposit for the
:-;pecific use and purpose for which it was entrusted to the said 'V alker Brothers Dry Goods Company, to-wit; for the security, satisfaction and
payment of future advances and sales of goods,
wares and merchandise l>v Walker Brothers Drv
Goods store to the wife or" plaintiff, and not othm:wise."

'V

As to each of said Findings, the Appellant asserts
that (a) the trial conrt ened in making the Finding as
D~ matter of law; and (b) that the evidence in the case is

12
wholly iusnffh::ientt to support both or either of said
Findings.
Assigmnents 1, 10 (a and e), and 11 each rmse the
question as to whether or not a trust relationship existed
between plaintiff and ~Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company and also as to whether or not there existed a trust
fund or res.
1.

ALICE J<'RYE WAS A SIMPLE CONTRACT CREDrTOit OF

1VALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMl'AN L
ASSIGNEE,

SUCCEEDBD

TO

HE!t

RIGHTS

PLAINTIFF AS HEU
AND

ASSUMED

HER

LEGAL STATUS IN REGAHD TO '1'1-LE FUNDS LOANED BY HER TO
THE COMPANY.

'l'he plaintiff on cross-examination was asked:

"Q. Now, I will ask yon to state whether
or not this account of l\lrs. Young's or Miss
Frye's was transferred to you 'q" (Abs. 34; Tram;,

37).
Plaintiff's answer to this question was as follows:
''A. I had for years and years back, she
was our old nurse g·irl, a1H1 I had the handling of
this fund, had it long hefore I put it in the store.
I put it in there, I ~was trustee, and in my last
vear I had ]\Irs. Chase tram;fer it to mv account.
I didn't want to involve her in any re~~eivership
proceeding-s. I was taking eare of this fund for
her. 1 told l\lr.s. Chase to transfer it to mv aecount aml apply enoug·h to clean up Mrs. Walker'.;;
account and 1 would leave the balance there for her
account. She was in the habit of running au ac-
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eount of two or three thousaml dollars a year. I
couhl have drawn it out if I had wanted to."

In this testimony is found the origiu of the claim
whieh is the basis of this action. The testimony of con.
trol accountant, Chase, (Abs. 19 and 20; Trans. 25 and
26) throws further light on Alice ]'rye's relation to
the plaintiff and to the eompany.
'' Q. Do you kno\Y, Mrs. Chase, when this
Alice :B'rye aceount was opened"?
A. It nmst have been before I had the books,
I never received any deposits.
Q. Alice Frye and Aliee Young are the same
person~

A.

y,es sir.

Q.

Do you know who that lady was?
I never seen (sic) her.
Do you know who she was'?
I knew there was such a person.
She was employed in the home of Mr.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
Walker~

A.

Ye-s, sir.
Q. As a domes tie servant?
A. Ye-s, sir.
Q. Did you ever aceept any money direet
from Mrs. Frye rg

A.

No.

Q. How was Illoue.Y brought there to the
credit of her a'ccounto?
A. Mr. ·walker ahn1ys hl'ougUt it to the
store. J don't think I ever di(l reecivc anv moneY
on it myself. I used to /i[;ure the inter-Psf.
·
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(~. You never saw Miss J1'rye or .i\lrs.
Young"?
A. I never saw her."

It is obvious from the foregoing eviumwe that Alice
Frye was never an employee of the company. She was
a domestic servant in \Yalker 's home. 'l'he funds delivered to the company by ~Walker belonged to Miss Frye
auu credit was given by the company to her. 'rhe account stood in the name of Ali('e Frye. She was recognized by the company as the principal and with regard
to the handling of her money \V alker was her agent in
dealing with the company. Until Alice J1'rye assigned
her claim to \Valker, the <'ompany knew only her as tlw
owner of the claim. Thi! eontraet was between the company and Miss F'rye. No matter what \Valker may uesig1wte the legal status he individually occupied towards
Miss Frye iu regard io her funus, as between the com·
pany and Miss Frye the relation was simply of that o l'
debtor and creditor. She, acting through her ag·eut,
Walker, loaNed the money to the eorporatimJ. On thu
company there rested the contract duty of paying interest on the borrowed funds, awl repayment of principal to her on her demand. There was no duty to \Valker.
"It is also elementary law that the principal
is entitled to tl1e benefit of a eoutraet made in
his name by au authorized agent."
Hartford Distillery Co. v. N. Y. N. H. R.
Co., 115 Atl. (Conn.) 488;
Savage vs. Hix, ~) New Ilampshirc 2G:3;
Stone vs. \V ood, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 453;
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~lerchants

Bank vs. Hayes, 7 Hun. (N. Y.)

530.
'l'he fundamentals of the transactions between Miss
Frye and the company dearly demonstrate that she
loaned her funds to the company and the company borrowed the same from her. 'l'he company agreed to pay
her interest alHJ did in truth pay intereRt (Abs. 20;
Trans. 2G) for the use of her funds. There can be no
trust relationship deduced from this agreement to pay
interest. In truth the agreement to pay interest connotes
u debt-not a trust fund. ''If a marn pays interest for
money he must be entdled to the •use of it. When a rnmt
locks np 'money which is intrusted to him in a box, he
does twt pay interest O'n it." In re BToad 13 Qu,eens
Hench J)·inision 740. Miss Frye occupied no different
position towards the company than that of the numerous
hank creditorR, which loaned their fnnds to the company in consideration of the payment of interest. She
was a stranger to the company and the company borrowed call money from her. ''Interest is the compensa.
tir!ll paid for the use of money. It is allowed on the
grou-nd of some contm.ct, exp1·ess or iutplied, to pay d,
or as dwma.rJeS fo1· the breach of some contract, or the
violat,io'n of some duty." Arizona Eastern R. Co. v.
Head, 26 Arizona 259; 224 Pnc. 1057. "Interest is the
compensation allowe-d by law, or fixed by the pa1·ties,
for the use or forebeat·a11,ce of money, or as da,ma,ges fo•r
-its detention,." 15 R. C. L. See. 1, page 3.
The agreement of the company to pay Miss Frye
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interest on her advances to the company, plainly stamps
the transaction at:J one between debtor and creditor. Upon receipt of her funds the company could do what i:
desired with them. It was not to invest them in a trust
fund for her benefit and then pay her interest on them.
It was intended that it use them in the company business
~ud pay her interest for such use of her money. Therefore, up to the point when \\' alker paid Miss I<-, rye the
amount of her claim and in return secured her assignment thereof, the corporation was but a simple contract debtor of Miss Frye. She was a simple contraez
creditor. Walker sueceeded to her legal rights and as:,umed her legal position.
2.

WALKER's TRANSACTION WTTH MHS. CHASE, CONTROL

ACCOUNTANT OF THE CORPORATION, DID NOT CONVERT THE
BALANCE OF THE SIMPLE CONTltACT INDEBTEDNESS FORMERLY
OWED BY THE COHPORATION TO MISS FRYE AND THEN OWED
TO \VALKER, INTO A TltUST FUND, NOH DID IT MAKE THE CORPORATION TRUSTEE OF THE BALANCE OF THE INDEBTEDNESS.

Walker in his testimony quoted above (Abs. 34;
Trans. 37) and found on page 12 of this brief, gives us
his version of the transaction with Mrs. Clbase, the company employee who had charge of these employee loan
uccounts. Mrs. Chase furnishes correlative evidence on
the same subjed (Abs. 18; 'l'rans. 24 and 25):
"A. At this time Mr. \Valker asked me to
trant:Jfer tlw aecount of Ali<'(~ Young Fry(~ from
her savings a(~Colmt to pay the account of Mrs.
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.T. R. .\Valker and it left a balance of two thousand
dollars, somewhere around that. He said Mrs.
\Valker would he charging more merchandise and
we would use that to pay the account, use this two
thousand to pay the account when her account
was that amount."
Q. As I understand it, this Frye account
was applied first to the payment of the indebtedHess then owing the company by Mrs. \Valker.
A. Yes sir.
Q. That was some three thousand dollars.
A. Yes sir.
Q. And that left a balance'?
A. Left a balance of somewhere around two
thousand dollars.
Q. It was with reference to that balance, Mr.
Walker told you to hold it and apply it on the
future purchases of 1\lrs. Walker, was it?
A. Yes sir."
\Yhen Walker seeured his assignment from Miss
Frye, after paying to her the amount of her claim against
1lw <~orporation, the Fry account was approximately
$3,~Jml.8i). 1\lrs .•J. H. ·walker owed the corporation about
$:3000.00 011 an open account for merchandise sold and
delivered to her. This debt due from Mrs. Walker, was
paid in full by transferring approximately $3000.00 from
the Fry account to the credit of this Mrs. J. R. \Valker
aeeount. 'l'he balance of the Frye account (then owned
hy Walker) after this trau:,;fer, wa:,; $2,909.85 and it is
this balance which is the subject of this action. Aecor<ling to Walker, he tohl Mrs. Chase "to transfer it
(the Frye account) to my account and apply enough to
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dean up .Mrs. vValker 's account and leave the balance
there for her account." Mrt-1. Chase states that Walker
said: "Mrs. vValker would be charging more merchandise
and we would use that (the balance of $2,909.85) to pay
the account, UHe this two thousand to pay the account
when her account was that amount.''

It is upon this transaction and conversation that
the plaintiff must rest his case that a trust ·was created
It will be noted that the plaintiff paid no funds to the
company. He and Mrs. Chase dealt only with the balance of the Frye account. Was this balance of the Frye
account ($2,909.85) transfonned from a simple contract
debt into a trust fund? In order to entitle plaintiff to
payment in full there must be found in this transaction
all of the elementH necessary to nHtablish a trust relationship between ·walker and the company. \Ve have
demonstrated that the relationship between plaintiff'~"
r,ssignor, Miss Frye, and the company, was that of debtor
and creditor and that \V alker, as her assignee assumed
the same position. When he came to .Mrs. Chase to
deal with this Frye account he was then but a commou
creditor of the corporation.
The case of Blakey vs. Brinson, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on May 16, 1932 and
found in Vol. 52 Supreme Court Reporter 516--Advance
Sheet No. 14, June 1, 1932, was an action against tlw
receiver of a national bank. \V e quote the facts fr-om
l\lr. J ustiee Stone's opinion (this was a unanimous decision):
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''Respondent maintained au interest-bearing
savings account with the bank, in which his credit
balance on Octolwr 14, 1929, was $1,961.31. Shortly before that date, rc::-;poudcnt had had conversations with an officer of the bank, in the course
of which the latter signified the willing11ess of
the bank to purchase $4,000 of United States
bonds for respondent. On October 10, he stated
to respondent that the hank would send to Richmond for the bonds, and asked him to bring
to the hank on the 14th such amount, in addition
to his credit balance, as would be required to pay
for the bonds. On the latter date respondent
drew a check for $2,100 upon another bank, which
he deposited in his savings aceount, thus increasing his dcposi t balance to $4,0G1.31. Ou the 15th,
the same officer of the bank informed respondent
that the bonds had been ordered, and on the 19th
said to him, 'I have your bonds', and handed to
him a charge slip whieh stated: "rhis is to advise yon that we have this day charged your aceount as follows:
4,000 Fourth L. L. 41Ji ~l Bonds ________ $3,960.00
.60
Acct. Int. -----------------------------------------------4.00
Cormnission ---------------------------···············
$3,964.60
On October 21 the bank charged respondent's
savings account on its books with $3,964.60, ancl
ercdited a like amount as a 'deposit' in a 'bond
account' appearing on its boob. The bond account contained only a tlaily record of credits
in the account of d1ceks and deposits and their
total, ·without any reference to respondent or
any other customer of the bank. The nature and
purpose of the aeeount docs not otherwise appear.
\Vhen the bank closed its <loon; on October 26,
it was discovered that in fad no bonds had beeJJ
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purchased, ordered, or re<~eived for the respondmd. 'l'lw only transactions !1ad ·with respect to
respondent or his account were the conversations
with the offieer of the bank and the entry of the
debit and credit items mentioned.
On these facts, the Distri<'t Court concluded
that the bank had rereived $3,~)64.00 in trust for
the purpose of purchasing the bonds, all<l that,
as the funds in the hands of the receiver lm<l been
augmented hy the wrongful commingling of the
trust fund with the other funds of the hank, respondent was entitled to payment in preference
to the ge11eral ereditors of the bank. The Court
of Appeals thought that the trust arose <mly on
the 19th, when the bank stated that respondent\;
aecount had been charged with the purehase pri('e
of the bonds, but reached the same eonclusion as
respects the increase of the funds in the hands of
the receiver and the right of respondent to preferential payment.
The petitioner iusists, as matter of law, that
no trust ever eame into existence as the result of
these transactions.''
This case is submitted as a condusive authority in
favor of the defendant receiver's position in this case
that the Walker-Chase transaetion and conversation rlid
not change the balan{·e ( $2,909.85) of the Frye aecoun f
into a trust fund. Justice 8tone cogently writes:
"It would have been equally competent for
respondent io have provided for the purchase of
the bonds either by the creation of a trust of
funds in the hands of the hank, to be used for
that purpo:,;e, or hy estaMishing a credit to be
debited with the cost of the bonds when purchased. But onlv if the former was the method
acloptecl could r~spondent, upon the bank's in-
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solvency and failure to purchase bonds, recover
the fund or its proceeds, if traceable, in prefer·
enee to general creditors. * * * The relationship
established between the hank and respondent by
his Ravings ac(~onnt was, from its inception, that
of debtor and the credit balance of $1,961.31 in
respondent's account on October 14 represented
the amount of the bank's indebtedness to him. "'
* * The situation thus created continued without chang-e until the 19th, when the bank's officer
advised respondent that the bonds had been purchased. If the advice was true, as respondent believed it to he, he was then called upon to pay
to the bank the amount of the purchase price, and
the hank proceeded, with the assent of the respoudent, to liquidate the supposed obligation
by charging his savings account with the exact
amount of the stated purchase price, with interest and r~ounuissions added. vV e can find in this
method of dischargiug a supposed obligation no
hint of an intended alteration of the debtor awl
creditor relationship, with which respondent had
been content from the beginning, to that of trustee and cestui que trust.
The court helo·w thought that the legal eonsequence to he attributed to the debiting of the
account with the supposed purchase price of the
honds was the same as if the respondent had
cashed a cheek for tl1o nwount and had tl1en proceeded to hand the money hack to the bank under
a specific agreement between him and the bank
that the money was to be held as a special fund,
for the sole purpose of eompleting the purchase.
This view is not ·without support.

*

*

* * * * * *

Such a procedure, if actually carried out,
might afford a basis, whieh is lacking here, for
the inference that respondent, no long-er c~ontent
with the role of rreditor, hacl sought to establish
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a trust fund. But the mere debiting of his ne.count, without more, for the reitnbnrsement of
the hank for the obligation which it was supposed
to have irwurrcd or paid, lemls no support to such
an inference. rrhe emwellation of the credit balance by the debit neither suggests any intention
to establis:h a trust nor points to any identifiable
thing which could be the subject of it."
vVe quote this deeiRion at length because of the similarity of the legal positions of Walker in the case at
bar and of Brinson in the eited ease. Both were common
creditors when they ~went to their respective debtors anrl
entered into the transadions which resulted in litigation.
\Valker desired the eredit halanee of the Frye account
to be used in paying future indebtedness to be incurred
by his wife; Brinson desired the credit balance of his
~avings account to be used in the purchase of Liberty
bonds. \Yalker, if he had desired to ('reate a trust fund,
could have secured payment of the balance of the I<'ry(•
account and then turned it baek to the company under
a specitie agreement; Brinson eonld have drawn out
his funds and created a trust fund to buy bonds. Neither
lollowed a course of action from which it cau he inferred that he desired to withdraw from the role of
creditor and assume a new one of cestui que trust. Both
were satisfied to remain creditors. They trusted their
respec:tive debtor"s to perfor·m their respective agreements; they depended on their debtors remaining solvent
until the a.greements were executed. They accepted the
promises of their debto1·s and their a.pparent ji>nancial
abilities to perform. Walker in his testimony uncon-
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scionsly revealed his correct legal position. After testifying as to his conversation with and instructions to
Mrs. Char:;e (Abs. 34; Trans. 38 and 39) the following
colloquy between himself and his counsel occurred (Abs.
36; Trans. 38):

"Q. You left it (tho halanee of $2,909.85)
there upon the relimwe of that statement'?
A. Left it there expecting it to be paid on
tny wife's future purchases.
Q. That is the way you want to apply it
now?
A. Yes sir.''
Walker relied upon what~ The promise of tho company (aeting through its agent Chm;e) to apply the bal:mce in satisfaction of future purchases made by Mrs.
\\Talker. Certaiuly such promise does not create trust
relationship; it simply continued the former one of
debtor and eredi tor. Walker '·s position is even weaker
than that of Brinson. In Brinson's ease the bank did)
debit h·is account to reimburse itr:;elf for the purchase of
bonds which were not in truth made. ln \V alker 's case
no debit of tho balance of the Frye account was ever
made. If as .Justice Stone rmnarks, in Brinson's case,
"'rho cancellation of tho credit balance by the debit
neither suggests an intention to establish a trust nor
points to any identified thing which could be the subject
of it," how can it he said the balance of the Frye aeeount
standing alone plus the promise of the company to apply
it in a gi.veu manner changed such credit balance into a
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trust fund?
ative.

The answer, of eoun;e, must he in the neg--

The fact that the plaintiff instructed the company
to use the credit balance of the Frye ac-count for a particular purpose did not ehange the legal relationship of
the parties in ·regard to this balance. Walker by his assignment had become a general ereditor of the corporation and he so remained. He was content to remain in
that role and did not depart from it, and the orders he
gave to Mrs. Chase, as eompany representative, had no
affect on this relationship. The eredit balance was not
paid to him, and hy him returned to the company on a
specific trust so that particular funds were segregated
from the general funds and assets of the eompany. A8
further sustaining appellant's position there are cited:
Northern 1Hugar Corporation v. 'I'hompson,
13 Fed. (2nd) 829;
Noyes vs. First National Bank, 1G7 N. Y.
Supple. 288;
Craig VH. Bank of Graub~', :no Mo. App.
334;
Wetherell vs. 0 'Brien, 140 Ill. 14G;
Mutual Aecideut Assn. v .•Jacobs, 141 Ill.
261.
Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene B. & 'l'. Co., 36
Idaho 108, 210 Pae. G86;
Marine Bank v. F'ulton Bank, 2 vVall. (U.
R.) 2G2, 17 Law Ed. 785;
Commercial Rank of Penn. v. Armstrong,
148 U. S. flO, 1:3 .Supt. Ct. 533, 37 L. Eel.
363 ~
Minard v;;;. Watts, 18G Fed. 242;
_F'allga tter ,·s. vV a tts, 11 Fed. (2nd) 383 ;
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Phoenix Bank Ys. Risley, 111 U. S. 125;
Fidelity Assn. vs. Rodgers, 180 Cal. 683,
182 Pac. 426.
Let it he assumed for purpose of argument that
\V alker paid over to the company from his own funds
the sum of $2,909.85 and that at the time he did so the
couven.;atioll hetween him and Mrs. Chase occurred, and
that the funds so paid over by \\Talker were taken into
the bank accounts of the company and used by it in the
transaction of i t8 lm8iness-all with Walker's knowledge
as in the case at bar-. Can it be doubted that he sustained
any other relation than that of creditor to the company?
The authorities cited in the preceding paragraph are conelusive in supporting the statement he would be only a
common creditor. In addition, the Court should referto:
Schenck ()lwmieal Co. vs. Industrial A. aud
D. Go., 121 N. Y. Supple. 838;
Yorkshire Inve8tmeut Co. V8. )j-,owler, et al.,
78 Fed. (C. C. A.) 56;
Mahler v. Sanche, 79 N. E. (Ill.) 9;
Tucker vs. Lim, 57 Atlantic (N . •T. Equity)
1017;
Reddington V8. J_,anahau, et al., 59 Maryland 429.
It should be constantly bomo in mind that Walker
had positive knowledge that Miss Frye's funds had been
intermingled in the company's bank accounts and had
been used in the conduct of the company business. He
knew the company had set up no trust fund to guarantee
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a return of the loans made by Miss Frye to the company.
He knevv the entire transaction with regard to employee
savings and is therefore conclusively charged with hav·
iug freely assented, after he became the owner of Miss
Frye's claim, the pri·or relation ·of debtor and creditor
be continued.
That ·one party to a transaction reposes faith and
confidence in the other party which is violated or ahuse<l
is no ground for adjudging that a trust relation existed
between them. rr'here are additional elements which mnst
be present before a comt of equity is justified iu casting
the wrong-doer in the role of "trustee.'' The mmal
remedies on the law side of the c.ourt can he entirely
emasculated or destroyed if the measure is simply
whether tho wrong-doer violated a trust. The breach of
? simple contraet is, in au ethical sense, the abuse of
trust and coufidence, but no eourt has had the hardihood
to make the con tract breaker a "trustee". In the case
at bar, Walker directed the company that the balance of
the Frye account should be used to pay his wife's futun~
insurred indebtedness. Plaintiff did not seek iu this
action to eompel such application, but speeifically withdraw (-with consent of appellants counsel) the right to
set off (.r\Jhs. 75, Renshaw Trans. Gl) Mrs. Walker'~:;
indebtedness against the balance of the Frye claim, and
rested his action upon the theory that a trust had been
created in his favor. Out of the breach .of the instruetions by the company, plaintiff cannot construct a trm;t.
r.l1he authorities do not sustain him in his effort.
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'' rt'his complaint, in effect alleges, conversion
of money by defendant and the facts therein
stated utterly fail to bring the case within the
domain ·of equity, as the elements necessary to
ereate the relation of trustee and c~estui que trust
are not shown to exit. True plaintiff in his complaint designates the money he seeks to re·cover
as a trust fund, but this, ho.wever, is only the conPlusion of the pleader. The relations of the parties
to each other, because of and ,,~hich grow out of
the transaction in question, must be- determined
by the facts, what they did in the premises and
not by what the pleadeT ehom;es to label or eall
it in his pleading."

'' \Vhere one person employs another as an
agen1, loans money or sells property on credit,
a confidence and trust is imposed, to a greater or
less extent, and yet such transadions have never
been regarded by courts as falling within any
recognized class of trusts."
·
Weer v. Gaud, 88 Illinois 490.
''The various affairs of life in almost every
act beh-een individuals in trade and commerce
involve the Teposing of confidence or trust in each
other, and yet it has nevm• been supposed that because such a C'onfidence or trust in the integrity
of another has been extended and abused, that
therefore, a Pourt of e(1uity would in all such cases
assume jurisdiction.''
Doyle v. Murphy, 22 Illinois 502.

"It is true that uses and trusts are a favored
part of the jurisdiction of the chancellor, and
frequently he will on that ground, decide in cases
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where the law may be adequate to give relief. But,
notwithstanc1iug this acknowledged authority, it
c~nnot be extended to every ca·se where one party
has trusted another, or in other words, placed a
confidence which has been abused. If so, every
case of haihuent, and every instance of plaeing
chattel:,;, by loa11s or hire, would be swallowed up
by oourts of equity. Nay, every ease where credit
was given for debt or duty, would soon he drawn
into the same vortex.''
Ashley's Administrators v. Denton 1 Litt.
(Ky.) 86.
"Something more than a trust reposed in one
is required to make him a 'trusteP' according
to its intent."
People ex rei. Smith , .. Commissioner, 100
N. Y. 216, :3 N. I~. 8:").
''In almost all ·of the eonunercial tmnsadio11s
of the country eonfideuce is reposed iu the punctuality and integrity of the debtor, and a violation of these is, iu a commercial sense, a di'Sreg·ard of a trust. But this is not the relatiou
spoken of in the first sedion of the ad."
Wilson v. Kirhy, 88 Illinois GGG;
Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 Howard (U. S.) 202.
\Ve make reference to the statement of J ustiee Folland in the recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court
in Tooele County Board ·of Education v. Hadlock _______ _
Utah ________________ ; 11 Paci11c (2nd) 320 (at page) 323:
"No case has been called to our atteution,
and none has been found by us, holding that under
circumstances such as these a deposit made in a
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bank by means of a check <lra wn on that
bank will not be impressed with a trust where it
would have heeu so impressed had the check been
drawn on another bank. It is undisputed that
there was in tho bank more money than was required to pay the check when it was presented to
tho bank on Dec. 24, 19i30 * * * The transaction
was one equivalent to the hoard demanding and
receiving its money and thereafter placing it on
depm;it iu the bank to its credit.''
In this ease a trust ex maleficio was admitted, if tho
other requirements of law vvere met. The above quoted
c:xcerpt vvm; in answer to the Bank Oommissioner's arg-ument that by reason of the transaction no new money
came into the bank and therefore its assets were nolt
inereaEwd or augmented. r:rhe ruling of the court is correct sinee it was dealing with the question of augmentation of assets and not with the question as to whether 11.
creditor· had changed his legal status from that of creditor to cestni que tntst, which in the instant case is one
of the important issues.
The above quoted ruling in the Tooele Bank case
cannot support a contention in this case that since Walker might have received a check for the balance of the
:F'rye account ($2,909.85) and then forthwith endorsed
aud delivered tho check back to the company upon an
express trust, that Walker's transaction and conversation with tho accountant, Chase, was such a legal equivalent. This was the exact argument advanced by Brin::;on in the United States Supreme Court case (above
cit ell aud discussed at leng·th) to sustain his position
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that his status of creditor had been chanped to that of
cestui que t1·u.st. The court unanimously denied the
soundness of such logic.
Thoro is a detini te distinction between the position
of the Tooele County Board of Education in its transa('-tion and the position that Walker occupies in this case.
These distinetions may be set forth in the following
manner:
Tooele County Board

Walker

1-A Trust ex malificio in
favor of the Board arose
because Sec. 4500 Comp.
Laws of Utah, as amended,
had been violated bv the
Board's treasurer ari~l the
bank.

1-Walker, as assignee of
Miss Frye, was a common
creditor of 'Valker Bros.
Dry Goods Co. when he
eame to deal vvith Mrs.
Chase awl give iustruetions
as to the disposition of the
Frve aeeouut then owned
by· him.

2-The Board by receiving
a check from the county
treasurer drawn 011 the
bank and depositing it to
the credit of its aerount in
the bank, affirmatively assumed a position, by opeTc~tion of said Sec. 4500, as
amended, other than that of
creditor. The statute created a trust without regard
to the intention of the
Board.

:!--\\~alker,

after orcleriuo·

$:lOOO of the F'ne aceom~t

to he used to pa·y the thou
pres ell t indebtedness due
ilw company from his wife,
t·ook no action from \vhich
it can he inferred that he
intended to transform his
position as creditor, into
that of cestui que trust. He
simply g·ave orders as to
how the balance due him
should he used. He elected
to allow the balance to
stand to his crodi t.
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:3-The deposit of the
county treasurers check to
the eredit of the Board effected a complete ehange in
the ownership of the funds.

:J-'L'he balance of the Frve
aceount remained in its
previous sta:tus, and Walker, after his instructions
to Chase, still remained the
owner of it.

4--The Court was considering the question of augmentation of assets and its
ruling is directed to this
point.

4--The court must decide
whether 'Valker changed
his position from creditor
to cestui que trust.

Particular reference is made to the case of Bledsoe
vs. H annnons, :~G Ari:t.ona 4~9; 287 Pac. 297, which was
distinguished in Tooele County Board v. Hadlock, supra,
as having no application to the situation under consideration. Frederick's actions in that case bear a close
similarity to those of Walker in the present case. Neither
of them changed their relation in regard t'o their respective elaims ctJt·d ·in each case there was no change in the
m.cnership of the indebtedness. ~While rightly ruled out
of consideration in the Tooele Bank case, it has a proper
applica1tion to the situation in the case at bar. Its irrelevancy in the one case makes it in point in the other
case.

II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT AT THE TIME OF THE
APPOINTMENT OF DEFENDANT AS RECEIVER OF
WALKER BROS. DRY GOODS CO. THAT THERE
CAME INTO ITS HANDS SUMS OF MONEY WHICH
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REPRESENTED MISS FRYE'S SO-CALLED "DEPOSITS" IN EITHER THEIR ORIGINAL OR SUBSTITUTED FORM IN EXCESS OF PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM OF $2,909.85 AND THAT THE ASSETS OF
THE COMPANY WHICH CAME INTO THE HANDS
OF THE RECEIVER WERE AUGMENTED BY AND
TO THE EXTENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM. HENCE
FINDING NO. X IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE SAME.
Assignments of Error Nos. 6 and 7 c·over the a boYe
proposition.
There is positive evidence iu the record as t.o the
methods pursued by tltu eompany in handling funds
loaned to the company by its employees. 'rhey were intermixed with other reeeipts and funds of the ('Oillpan.Y
and were deposited in the eompany banks. "\\'hen it
came to making deposits no distinction as to funds representing employees savings and funds representing tlw
sales ·was made. They were all put together.'' ( Ahs. 5:~;
Renshaw 'rrani-l. 3H and 39). When the bank balance"
accumulated to a cel"tain point, time certificates of (lcposit \vould be purchased (..Abs. G4; Renshaw Trans. 40).
No special eertifieatcs of (leposit were purchased with
the employees loans. 'l1 ime depm;it eertifieates were al'quired with Lank eredits, which contained general n'eeipts of the company and the employee loans. (Ahs.
54; Henshaw Trans. 40).

It will be noted tlwt ·in each instance the funds rrpresenting employee luwns were deposited in cornpMI.y
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banks. There is no evidence that nny other disposition
or use 1cas ever made of them. The obligations of the
company were paid from the common fund at the banks,
composed of receipts from all sources. (Abs. 63; Renslm w Trans. 48). Sometime previous to the date upon
which tho defendant receiver was appointed and assumed control of the company and its properties, the
time certificates of deposit had been cashed and the funds
used in the company business (Abs. 59; Renshaw Trans.
44). No certifica tos of deposit existed upon the receiver's appointment. (Abs. GO; Renshaw Trans. 44).
The reconl is silent as to whether on date of appointment of rec-eiver there were balances to the credit of
the company at its hanks. The defendant in its answer,
hO\Yever, admitted that at the time of its appointment
there ca.me into 'its hands sums of money in excess of
plaintiff's elaims. However, it will be noted that this
admission does 1wt admit that there were f1mds on deposit ·in the depositMy banks of the company. The aldutission is litera.l ''that there carne ·into its hands tsums
of money." This is not an admission that there ·were
ba.nk balauces im favor of the company, wh·ich cam,e under
the control and into the possession of the receiver. It
is ain admission that 1cash funds not on deposit came
·into the rece·iver's possession.
'l'here is no evidence that these cash funds ·which
the receiver admitted it received contained a peuny of
money paid in by Aliee Frye. Beyond all peradventure
the~, did not, for Walker dealt with Mrs. Chase in May

or early June, 19~}0, prior to the receivership (Abs. 12;
Trans. 20 and 21) as to the Frye account and Miss Frye
had made her so called "deposits" long prior to that
time. Deposits by the company were made daily (Abs.
53; Renshavv rrrans. 38) in its depository banks.
The deductions frolll this evidence are obvious: (a)
the cash funds which came into the receiver's hands eontained none of Alice Frye's money, and (b) at date of
receiver's appointment there were no credit balances Rt
the banks in favor of the company. Hence Finding X
is clearly erroneous and there is not the slightest evidence to support it. rrhe balance of the Frye account
in no sense augmented the assets of the company cmning
into defendants' bmtk as receiver.

III.
THE FUNDS OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR PAID TO
WALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY
WERE NOT HELD IN ANY SPECIAL DEPOSIT OR
FUND, BUT WERE INTERMINGLED IN THE
FUNDS OF THE CORPORATION AND USED IN
THE OPERATION OF ITS BUSINESS. THE EMPLOYEES' SAVINGS "DEPOSITS" HAVE NOT BEEN
TRACED INTO ANY FUND, SECURITY OR ASSET
COMING INTO THE ~OSSESSION OF THE RECEIVER BUT ON 'THE CONTRARY, THE EVIDENCE
AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS THAT THEY WERE ENTIRELY DISSIPATED PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF THE RECEIVER. HENCE, EVEN IF
THE "DEPOSITS" CONSTITUTED TRUST FUNDS,
THE PLAINTIFF MUST FAIL BECAUSE HE CANNOT TRACE THE "DEPOSITS" IN THEIR ORIGINAL OR SUBSTITUTED FORM.
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Assignments of Error Nos. 8, 10 ( d and e) and 11
are the foundation upou which the discussion of the
foregoing proposition rests.
'The employee '' depoSiib-;'' after having been received by the company, were commingled

indiscrimiuate~y

with funds of the company reeei ved from its daily sales
and other sources. (Abs. 5:3; Renshaw 'l'rans. 39). These
company funds were deposited daily in the banks, and
in making up the deposits no distinction as to funds representing employees' savings and funds representing
sales was made. '!'hey were all put together. The
company had no special bank account in which the employees' savings were kept alone. (Abs. 53; Renshaw
Trans. 39; Abs. 57; Renshaw 'frans. 42). The employees'
savings were not earmarked. (Aibs. 34; Renshaw Trans.
40).
The company maintaine!l several banking depositories and when the credit balance in favor of the
company in a particular bank would reach a certain
point, a time certificate of depos,it would be purchased
from such bank. ( Abs. G4; Renshaw Trans. 40; AJbs. 58;
Renshaw 'l'rans. 43), but at no time was a certificate of
deposit purchased which contained on~y the funds of employees which had been paid over to the company. (Abs.
57 ; R,ensha w Trans. 42). These eertifiea tes of deposit
were '' emergenc~' funds'' and were intended to take care
of "anything in an emergency." (Ahs. :l2; 'rrans. 36).
'l'here were uo time eertiftcates of deposit owned by the
company on date of the appointment of the receiver.
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They had all been cashed prior to that datl~ and used in
the company busine::;s. (Abs. 59; Renshaw Trans. 44).
rrhe funds paid over to the company by Mi::;s :B_,rye
were handled in the same manner as the funds paid to
the company by itt:; own employees. (Abs. 19; Trans. 25;
Abs. 23; Trans. 27).
The defendant in its ans\ver admitted that at the
time of its appointment as receiver there eame into its
hands as sueh reeeiver ''sums of money in exce:-;s of
plaintiff's claim," but it denieu that the asset::; of \Valker Bros. Dry Goods Company coming into its hanus
as receiver were augmented by and to the extent of
plaintiff's claim. (Abs. 4, 5, 6 and 7).
The legal prineiples involved in the situation presented by the evidence in this case eannot be subjeet
to any seriou:-; dispute. The Supreme Cburt of Utah
has definitely eluciuated the rules of law which govern
in this jurisdietion. r_f_'he appellant therefore submits
the following authorities, whi<'h support its position as
set forth above:
"'I' he doctrine of equity, as regards property
di::;posed of by persons in a fiduciary position,
is that whether the dispm;itiou of it he rightful
or wrongful, the henefieial owner is c'ntitled to
the proeeeds, wlwtever be their form, provided
only he can ideutify tlwm. If they cannot be
identified, by rea::;ou of the tru,.;t money being
mingled with thai of thu trnsle<', Uwn the cestui
que. trust is entitled to a elHuge upon the new
investment to the extent of the trust money trace-

37
able into it; that then~ is uo <listinetiou between
an express trustee and an agent, or bailee, or collector of rents, or anybody else in a fiduciary
position, and that tlJCre is no difference between
inveshnenis in tho purchase of lands, or chattels,
or bonds, or loam;, or moneys <lepot-:ited in a bank
account.''
Sir Ooo .•J essel, l\1 aster of tho Rolls; quoted
with approval iu National Bank vs. Insurance Oo. 104 U. S. 68, and adopted
as the rule in Utah in \\'ad dell vs.
Waddell, an Utah 435; 104 Pac. 743.
"The C'ourts have frequently considered and
passed upon claims like tho one before us, hut
we know of no case whore it has been held that
a trust could be impressed on property or funds
\Vhere it is conceded to be impossible to trace or
identify tho property or funds, either in its original or substituted form * * *. It was not held
iu the Waddell C'ase ( ~~6 Utah 4i15) nor in any
other, so far as we arc aware, that a court has
ever impressed, or has attempted to impress, a
trust upon certain property or upon a certain
fund where the original trust property or trust
fund can no longer be traced or identified, either
in its original or substituted form."
Kent vs. Kent, 50 Utah 44, 165 Pac. 271,

15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100.
'' \Vheuever a trust fund has been wrongfully
eonverted into another speeios of property, if its
identity can be traeed, it will be held, in its new
form, liable to tho rights of the cestui que trust.
No change in its state and form can divest it of
sueh trust. So J.ong as it can be identified, either
as the original property of the eestui que trust,
or as the product of it, equity will follow it; and

the right of reclamation attaches to it until detached by the superior equity of a hona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice. The substitute for the original thing- follow!" the nature of the thing itself RO long- as it
ean he aseertainell to he snch. But the rig·ht of
pursuing· it fails when the means of asrertainmcnt
fails. This is always the case wheu the subject
matter is turned into mone~~ and mixed and ronfounded in a g·eneral mass of property of the same
description.''
Thompson Appeal 22 Penn. State lG.
"A trust rreditor is not entitled to a prcferenre over general creditors of the insolvent
merely on the gTotmd of the nature of hiR claim.
To au'thorize s~ch a preference, Rome specific recog-nized equity founded on tlw relation of the debt
to the assets in the handR of the assignee or receiver, and whirh entitles the elaimant, according to cqnita hlc prineiplcR, to a prefcrcnPe in
navmcnt ont of those as:-;etR, must hr cstahlisherl
by. evidence. The person rlaiming- to he a trust
creditor must in order to establish hiR rig·ht to
a preference, trace the trust money into some srwci:fic property, fund, sccnrit~v, or account of tlw
insolvent \Yhich has passed into the hands of the
receiver or assignee, all(l the proeeeds of which
arc to he distributed. TT e must identify the fuml
out of which he demands to he prefer~·ed in distribution either as the original trust property or
as a product of it. 'x' * * The 1·ight to pursue
the fund fails when the means of identifying awl
ascertaining it fails."
Groff vs. City Savings Fund & Trust Co,
4G Penn. Superior Ct. 423;
Lifter vs. Earl Co. 76 Penn. Superior Ct.
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Corporation CommiRsion v. .Merchants
Bank & Co., 1:38 S. :B.J. 23 (R C.).
'"rhe authorities arc generally agreed that
the rig-ht of the ecstui que trm-:t to reclaim trust
funds in specie, or impress a trm;t upon other
property in the hands of the trustee, iR founded
upon the right of property and not on tho grounds
of compensation for its loss, alHl hence the beneficiary of a trust fund is not entitled, merely becanRe of the character of its claim, to payments
out of the insolvent trustee's assets in preference
to general creditors, hut must trace and identify
the trust funds in order to reelaim them. * * *
There are, however, well-established principles
which govern the duties of a cestui que trust, aR
depositor in a bank, who seeks to trace and reclaim his fund. It is well settled that, when a
trustee wrongfully counningles trust funds with
his own funds, equity will impress the trust upon
the entire mass with which the trust fund has
been commingled in order to permit the reclamation of the trust fund. ~W'" addell v. ~\Y addell, 36
Utah, 435, 104 P. 743. The leading case in whicl1
the principles applicable to this situation were
announced is the English (~ase of In ro Hallet's
Estate, 13 Law Rep., Ghancery Div. 696. There
tho rule was laid down, which has since been followed with almost unbroken uniformity, that the
cestui que trust will not be called upon to identify
particular money constituting his trust fund, but
that, if the trustee has mingled the trust funds
with his own, the entire mass is impressed with
the trust to the extent of the amount of the trust
funds, and where the trustee had made payments
from the mingled fund he will be presumed to
ha vo expended for his o\vn use and benefit, first,
his own money, and, lastly, the trust fund, and
that tho cestui qno trust will be permitted to
recover from such mingled fund, and in prefer-
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enee to common creditors, the amount of money
representing the lowest halanc·e to whieh tlte
mingled funu fell from the inception of the trust
to the date of insolveney. There may he some
qualifications to this general rule, but, so far as
this case is eoncenwd, the principles stated are
applicable. The rule is also stated as follows:
"The same rule as to identifying or tracing the
funds applies to publie as to private funds. The
money must be identified or traeed into some
other specific fund or property. There is a presumption, however, that what remains at the time
of insolveney is a trust fund. The law presumes
that trust funds were not appropriated and that
a balance of ·cash in the hanus of the clepository
is the trust funus. '' 22 H. C. L. 231.
In ease the~ mingled fund is sufficient to pay
the trust claimant in full, the presumption is that
only the money of the trustee has been expended,
but, where the trustee has expended, not only his
own money out of tlte mingled fmul, hut has also
dipped into and expended pnrt of the trust fund,
the trust claimant will he entitled to recover only
the amouut which remains, aucl he is entitled to
recover tl!is, even though the balance is less than
the total of the trust fund.''
rrooe!e County Board vs. Hadloek, 11 Pac.
(2nd) at pgs. i324 and 325.
"But aside from this view of the evidence,
the claim to a general c·harge upon any and all
property acquired by the hank, through the use
of the general fulHls of the hank with which this
trust fund has been hlended is not supported by
the weight of authority; nor do the cases decided
by this court go so far. rPlwt the misuse of this
trust fund has g:mc to swell, in one form or another the ge11eral assets of the bank, is not enough
to charge the whole \Yith a lieu, will not be seri-
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ously contested. The cases \Yhich deny such a
co11teution arc numerous. To -impress a tntst upon the property of a tort feasor who has used the
trust fmzd in his zwivate afj'airs it mu.st be traced
in its original shape or .ntbstituted form."
Orawford County vs. Strawn, 157 Fed. (C.
C. A.) 1100,15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 100;
Srhuyler Ys. J.,ittlcficld, 2:32 U. S. 707.
"But we believe the majority cloetrine is
based upon sound prim·iplm; awl should be adhered to. Where no spceifie lieu is created by contrad, or acts of the partie:-;, Hone exists. 'J.1he
only course open to equity is to discover the cor-pus of the trust fund or to follow the ehanges of
trammmtations of the trust moneys into 80me partieular property or fund that ran be charged with
the trust, saving of course the right8 of innocent
purchasers for value."
:Meyer::;, R.cceiver v ..Matusek, 98 Florida at
pg. 1145, 125 .Southcm 360.
"The result of these deei8ions i8 that merely
showing that the trustee has received trust fund8
will impress a lien upon his assets unless it is
shown that his assets were not increased by the
misappropriation. But the great weight of authority is against this view."
Perry on 'l'rn8h> (7th Ed) Sec. 836.
''When trust money becomes so mixed up
witih the ·trustee's individual funds that it is impossible to trace and identify it as entering into
some specific property, the tru8t ceases. The
eonrt will go as far m; it 'can in this tracing and
following the trust money; but when as a matter
of fad, it cannot be traced, the equitable right
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of the ee:,;tui que trust to follow it fails. Under
such circumstauces, if tho tru:,;teo has become
bankrupt, tho court cannot say that tho trust
money it-~ to be found somo\vhore in tho general
estate of the trustee that shll remains; he may
have lost it with property of his o\m; and in such
case the cestui quo trust can only come in and
share \Yith the general creditors."
Little vs. Chadwick, 151 Ma:,;s. 10~),
2:3 N. K 1005, 7 L. R. A. 570.
"As a con:,;equenco there have been decisions
in some American states to the effect that if one's
general estate has been enric1hed by the proceeds
of trust property, the trust may be established
against the general assets even though the estate
is insolvent. ''' * '~ But these eases have been
either expressly overruled or groately limited and
qualified. * * '' In some states it has been held
that, while it is not tmougll to show that the trust
property went into the general assets, it is enough
to charge the whole estate with a trnst, if it can
be shown that the proeeeds remained unexpended
somewhere iu the estate. 'x' * * But by tho great
weight of authority, n trust cannot be established
again1st the proceeds o.f trust property, which has
been disposed of, unless the proceeds c.an be identified and traeed into some specifie fund or property. This is the doctPinP of·Iu rc Hallet's Estate
(13 Ch. Div. 696) to whieh we have already referred.''
Lowe v . .Jones, 192 Mass. 94, 78 N. E. 42,
6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 487;
Atkins v. Atkins, 180 N. E. (Mast-~.) Gl3.
"Before a eestui que trust ean elaim speeifie
real or person'al property, he must slJOw that it is
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the identical property originally covered by the
trust or that it is the fruit or product thereof in
a new form."
Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 California 22.
''To justify a recovery a beneficiary must b0
able to follow and i<lentify bhe property either in
its ori~:,rin'al or substituted form."
Orcut·t v. Gold, 117 Cal. 315, 49 Pac. 188;
FJlizade v. Eilizade, 137 Cal. 634, 66 Pac. 369.
:msta te of Arms, 186 Cal. 554.
Holland v. Bank of Italy, 1 Pac. (2nd) 1031.

"It is not enoug·h that the Estate o·f Lemon
may have beeu indire'ctly increased by reason of
his having used the trust fund to pay his own
debts."
Martin v. Smith, 33 Idaho 692, 197 Pac. 823.
"The right of a beneficiary to reclaim a trust
fund is brased upon his right of property, not upon
any right as a preferred creditor of the trustee."
Chase & Baker Co. v. Olmsted, 93 1,Vash. 306,
160 Pac. 952;
Heidelback v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661,
164 Pac. 247.
"'The proof does not definitely trace the proceeds of the sale of the converted property into
the cash on hand or into any specific assets of the
bank. It merely shows that the proceeds of these
securities went into and swelled the assets of the
bank, and thereaft\'r thev were usecl as all other
assets in the ordinary oy;eration of the bank. Un-der such cireurnstancers, the judgment of the court
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was erroneous in impressing a trust on the entire assets of t1he bank.''
'rylcr County State Bank v. SltiverH,
6 S. W. (2nd) (Texas) 108;
Prior v. Davis, Administrator,
109 Alabama 117, 19 South 440;
Matter of Cavin v. Glea1son, 105 N. Y. 256;
Maged v. Bank of United States,
234 App. Div. (N. Y.) 295, 254 N. Y.
ISuppl. 569;
Schneider v. Winchester Development Co.,
149 Atlantic (N .•J.) 636;
Commonweath v. Tradesmen's Trust Co.,
95 Atl. (Pa.) 574;
O'Neil v. Cleveland, 22:3 N. W. (Wis.) 82;
Rainwater v. Wildman,
289 S. W. (Ark.) 488.
The testimony of Mrs. Chase and the plaintiff shows
without qualific,ation t1l1at all employees'

savin~s

de-

posits, after being intermingled and confused with corporate funds received from aH other sourees, were deposited in one or mme of thP banking depositories of the
comp'any. There \Yas no special bank account to receive
these employee deposits, and they were eonsidered as
part of, the general funds of the company for use in its
business a>ctivities. 'rhe evidence further show:,; that
these bank credits were drawn upon without reference
to the source~ of origin of the creditH. 'rhe general allligations and expense of operation were paid from them,
and when an employee "depositor" desired to "withdraw" any of his "deposits" tlwy were given a cthcck
upon any of the depository banks without regard to the
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source of the funds on credit. (AJbs. 64; Renshaw r:L'rans.
48).
On the assumption that Miss :B-,rye 's funds or saviugs when pai(l to Hw compauy became trust funds and
uot a de'ht (we have clearly demoustrated above the
error of such assnrnptiou) the first step plaintiff is compelled to take is to trace these funds from the intermingled bank accounts where they h'ad heen confused
with other Crorporation funus. rrhis he apparently attempted to do by' testimouy of Mrs. Chase, and the
plaintiff reg·arding time certificates o.f deposit. (Aibs. 31,
rrrans. 36; Abs. :33, rrrans. 36 and 37; A,bs. 48, Renshaw
Trans. 34; Abs. 51, Renshaw Trans. 36). In order to
counect the employees' deposits with these time certificates of deposit plaintiff testified (Abs. 34; rrrans. 37) :
''A. Well, we had those special deposits
there to take care of the specia'l accounts and
other items as I stated before, those special accounts were the only liability we had that was
due on demand.''
Mrs. Chase stated (Abs. 51; Renshaw Trans. 36):
''A. This is what I meant by 'emergency';
we had some employees that had, say as high as
ten thousand dollars despostited, if they should
want to draw that ten t·housand out, but we
didn't have the mouev in our chr,ckinq accournt, or
in the t,ill, we eonld draw it out of this emergenc~v
account to pay them, this special aceount, if we
had to do that''.

46
:B-,rom this and like testimony it is evident that plaintiff is attempting to claim that these time certificates of
deposit ~were a trust funll to protect the employees' saving" deposits," but it shou'lcl be noted that even on plaintiff's own evidence this position must fail, because
(a) Plaintiff in his own testimony admits these
time certificates of deposit were "a reset·ve account to
take care of ainything in a·u eme·rgency" (A!bs. 32; Trans.
36) and "we had t,}wsc special deposits there to take care
of the special accounts a·11d other items ·~ ~· ~· '' (Abs. 34;
Trans. 37).
(b) Mrs. Chase states if "zce tlidn't have tha.t
money in our checking account or in the till'' we could
draw it out of this emergcuey account to pay them (Abs.
51; Renshaw Trans. 36).
These statements belie the claim that tile time certificates of depos,it were a trust fund set up to protect the
employees' saving "deposits", because they reveal two
definite faets which iu themselves contradiet plaintiff's
theory: P irst, the time certificates were to protect ''anything in an emergency''; and seeondly, '' Withdrawals''
by employees were made from these time certificates onl~·
if "we didn't haue that money i'll rmr checki·ng account or
in the till." How can it be sure,essfully claimed that the
time certificates were a trust fund for M1e benefit of the
employee "depositors" when these two admissions arc
made?
Ho,wever, aside from the intriusil· condition of
plaintiff's evideuee, plaintiff must rlepend upon Mrs.
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Chase's testimony given below to show that the employees' saving funds went into the time certificates
(Abs. 54; Reushaw Trans. 40):
"Q. You didn't earmark that money so it
would go right over to the Continental to pay a
time eer:tificate, did you"?
A. No.

Q. You didn't earmark it so it would be Mr.
Renshaw's to buy a certificate of deposit, did you'?
A. No.
Q. But that weut into the general account
indiscriminately7

A. Yes.''
and a'lso (A'bs. 58; Renshaw Trans. 43):
'' Q. What was .the practice in buying these
time eertificates of deposit, how often would you
buy them1
A. I don't remember.
Q. W ou:ld you do t,he actual purehasing of
them, or would "\Va1kcr or Dreyfous, or who attended to that?
A. Well, the Manager of the store would tell
ns when to get them.
Q. And then you would draw a cheek on your
general account 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Dc:pending-, one time if the National Coilper had a surplus balance, yon would hny tho
certifieate of <leposit at that bank~

A.

Yes."
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This evidence clearly shows that (a) time certificates
of deposit were purchased from the general bank accounts of tl1e company and that (b) no certificates were
purchased which represented employees' "deposits"
exclusively. It is lef,t to guesses and surmises as to
whether or not these time certificates of deposit ~were
pur.chased w,ith Mrs. ] 1 rye 's funds. The chances are
equal as to whether or not an)' of her funds went into the
time certifica,t.es. Certainly there is no positive and direct evidence that such was the fad. 'rhe most favorable aspect of plaintiff's evidence at this point leaves it
to a matter of conjeeture.

If, however, we accept a pure assumption or guess
that Miss Frye's funds \Yent into time certificates, the
next step in tracing the funds is wholly fa,tal to plaintiff's caus.e for note Mrs. Chase's evidence. (Abs. 59;
Renshaw Trans. 44):

"Q. You want your evidence to stand that
at the time the reeeiver was appointed, there
~were no time certificates~
A.

No, none then.''

and also (Abs. 60; Renshaw Trans. 44).
"(~.
But you know there were none
istence at that time"?

A.

lll

ex-

Not at the time of the receiver."

It is therefore plain t·hat prior to the date the receiver was appointed, these certifieates of deposit had
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been cashed and the proceeds used in the transaetion of
the company buS'iness. Certainly no time certificates
came into the hamds of the Receiver. T·lms ends plaintiff's trust fund search. lie ean go no further in his
proof.
Under the authorities cited above and in accordance
with the Uta·h rule, plaintiff must trace Miss Frye's
money into some specific fund or property, and "where
the original trm;t property or trust fund can no longer
be traced or ideut·ified either in its or,iginal or substituted form" the trust fails and plaintiff stands as a general creditor. He cannot claim a lien on the general
as•sets of the corporation, for the Utah Supreme Court
has expressly and emphatically adopted the majority
rule which refuses to extend the principle of tracing trust
funds beyond its log:ical scope. The fact that receiver
received ''sums of money in excess of the plaintiff'B
claim" forms no basis upon whieh plaintiff can claim a
lieu upon the generwl assets of the corporation. The evidence shows that (a) M.iss Frye's funds were intermingled and confused with the income from all other
sources and t.hus ·confused were deposited in one or more
of the company banks; (h) that it may be only conjectured that all or some part of Miss Frye's funds were
used to purchase time certifieates of deposit, and (c) all
time certificates were cashed and used in the company
business and none reached the hands of the receiver.
Under the rule annoum·ed in Utah in the Kent case
(supra) and Tooele Bank ease (:mpra) (and whieh is the
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majority rule), plaintiff has failed to trace any of Miss
Frye ',s funds into property or assets of the receivership
estate, but contra has shown that if the funds found their
way into the time certificates of deposit, a:ll such certificates had been cashed and the proceells expended prior
to the appointment of the receiver. Hence, the so-called
"trust fund" failed when the means of tracing it failed.
His right to follow his alleged ''trust funds'' failed with
proof that none of the ceriifica tes of deposit reached the
receiver's hands. The certificates were the end of his
trail. He made no proof that any of Miss Frye's funds
were a part of the cash funds of the compan~, which the
receiver admits it received. His proof was directetl
towards the certificates of deposit and when his trail
ran blind he cannot now retrace his steps in the direction
of the undeposited cash funds of the company which the
receiver secured on its appointment. Neither can the
plaintiff point to the general assets of the company (of
which the cash funds were a part) and elaim a preferreJ
lien thereon because he has no claim on the general
assets (other than that of a common creditor) upon his
failure to identify his alleged "trust funds" either in
its original or transmuted form.
CONCLUSION.

From the foregoing discussion
elusions logicaHy foUows:

t~he

following eon-

I.
The plaintiff, Walker, as assig-nee of Alice Frye, be-
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came but a common creditor of Walker Brothers Dry
Goods Company and he remained a common creditor at
all times. HiR orders to the company concerning the
'balance of the Alice 11-,rye account did not change this
credit balance into a trust fund nor constitute the company trustee and himself cestui que trust.

II.
The funds paid by Alice ]~rye to the company were
intermingled and confused in the genera'l assets of the
company and the plaintiff utterly failed to trace these
funds into any asset or property coming into the hands
of the receiver; hence his trust fa,iled and he is relegated
to the position of common Cl'(~ditor without preference.
In cousideration of the foregoing it is submitted
that the judgment in this case should be reversed, with
instructions to the trial court to enter judgment adjudicating that plaintiff is but a common creditor without
preference.
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